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Abstract 
The timeliness and quality of recovery activities are impacted by the organisation and human 
resourcing of the physical works.  This research addresses the suitability of different resourcing 
strategies on post-disaster demolition and debris management programmes.   
This qualitative analysis primarily draws on five international case studies including 2010 
Canterbury earthquake, 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, 2009 Samoan Tsunami, 2009 Victorian 
Bushfires and 2005 Hurricane Katrina.  The implementation strategies are divided into two 
categories: collectively and individually facilitated works.  The impacts of the implementation 
strategies chosen are assessed for all disaster waste management activities including 
demolition, waste collection, transportation, treatment and waste disposal.  The impacts 
assessed include: timeliness, completeness of projects; and environmental, economic and social 
impacts.   
Generally, the case studies demonstrate that detritus waste removal and debris from major 
repair work is managed at an individual property level.  Debris collection, demolition and 
disposal are generally and most effectively carried out as a collective activity.  However, 
implementation strategies are affected by contextual factors (such as funding and legal 
constraints) and the nature of the disaster waste (degree of hazardous waste, geographical 
spread of waste etc.) and need to be designed accordingly.  Community involvement in recovery 
activities such as demolition and debris removal is shown to contribute positively to 
psychosocial recovery. 
Keywords: disaster recovery, disaster waste, disaster management, human resourcing; public 
participation 
1. Introduction 
Recovery activities are impacted by the organisation and human resourcing of the physical 
works.  Activities on the critical path to recovery, such as demolition and debris management, 
must be effectively implemented to minimise delays in the recovery and rebuilding process and 
ensure quality outcomes.  The aim of this research is to assess the suitability, constraints and 
implications of different implementation strategies for disaster waste management activities.   
Recent natural disasters such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake (Booth, 2010), Victorian Bushfires 
2009 (Brown et al., 2010), Hurricane Katrina 2005 (Luther, 2008) and the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami (Basnayake et al., 2005) have all generated volumes of waste which overwhelmed 
existing solid waste capacities and required extraordinary management approaches.  Disaster 
debris can impede rescuers and emergency services reaching survivors; inhibit provision of 
lifeline support; pose a public and environmental health hazard; and hinder the social and 
economic recovery of the affected area.   
Implementation strategies of post-disaster waste management are often aligned with different 
stages and types of debris clearance works, and can be categorised as:  
1. Private property detritus (non-structural debris) clearance to kerbside or to central 
collection facility. 
2. Waste collection and disposal (includes collection, temporary staging areas1
3. Major repair debris management (i.e. debris resulting from major structural repair 
work). 
, recycling 
and disposal). 
4. Full demolition and associated debris management.  
5. Reconstruction waste management [not covered in this paper]. 
Basic implementation strategies for clean-up operations can be divided into the following 
categories: 
1. Collectively facilitated works 
a. Centralised contracts (portions of debris management works allocated to large 
contracting firms or organisations – private or public). 
b. Pooled labour forces (portions of debris management works carried out by 
individual labourers managed as a collective - paid or unpaid). 
2. Individually facilitated works (debris management works carried out at an individual / 
household level – contracted or self-managed).   
                                                     
1 Temporary staging facilities are commonly used in disasters.  They are sites where mixed waste can be 
brought or sorting before onward transportation to end-use management (recycling or disposal) facilities.  
2. Methodology 
Qualitative data has been gathered from literature and interviews with professionals involved in 
disaster waste management for five international case studies.  For this analysis the qualitative 
data was first interpreted to gain a general understanding of the implementation strategies 
(centralised contracts, pooled labour forces or individually facilitated works) for demolition and 
debris management works (see Section 3).  Second, the impacts of the implementation 
strategies on recovery were analysed: timeliness; completeness; environmental; economic; and 
social.  A list of implementation strategy attributes which contributed positively to each aspect 
of the recovery were listed (see Section 4).  The discussion section (see Section 5) considers the 
overall suitability of implementation strategies in various disaster situations and contexts. 
3. Case studies 
3.1 2010 Canterbury Earthquake, New Zealand 
On September 4, 2010, at 4:35am, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake rocked the Canterbury region of 
New Zealand.  Fortunately no one died, however, a significant number of commercial and 
residential properties and infrastructure were damaged.  Commercial structures affected were 
largely unreinforced masonry buildings.  Mixed building type residential properties and 
infrastructure were primarily damaged by the extensive liquefaction that occurred.  In January 
2011 the government estimated up to 3000 Canterbury homes were uninhabitable (Heather, 
2011).  Debris management from repair of minor damage was carried out by individual property 
owners.  Due to the large numbers of claims and need for coordination of works with suburb-
wide land remediation, the national natural disaster insurer EQC and private insurance 
companies engaged project managers to manage the recovery works (including demolition and 
debris management) under centralised contracts.   
3.2 2009 Victorian Bushfires, Australia 
The February 7, 2009 Victorian Bushfires cost 173 lives, affected more than 430 hectares of 
land (VBRRA, 2009) and over 3000 properties.  In affected areas the fire caused almost total 
destruction leading to large numbers of displaced persons.  The National and State governments 
elected to pay for, and facilitate through a centralised contract, the demolition and debris 
removal of all affected properties.  Overall the clean-up was a success.  All properties received 
the same demolition and debris removal services and the process was completed within six 
months - leading the way for the reconstruction.  Some affected persons, however, felt that the 
labour and contractors should have been sourced from the affected community – some claiming 
their exclusion reinforced the victim mentality and contributed to mental health problems 
(Brown et al., 2010). 
3.3 2009 L’Aquila Earthquake, Italy 
On April 6, 2009, L’Aquila, Italy, experienced a 6.3 magnitude earthquake.  The earthquake 
killed 314 people and displaced approximately 70,000.  The predominantly masonry buildings 
were heavily damaged – approximately 22,000 were rendered unusable (Dolce, 2010).  In Italy 
the government provides full funding for national disaster response and recovery.  The funding 
provided by the government allowed for a centralised approach to debris management.  The 
majority of the waste management works (including community drop-off centres, demolition, 
temporary storage and recycling) have been carried out by state or locally appointed 
contractors.  Management of debris resulting from major structural repairs and minor repairs 
were the individual property owner’s responsibility – major repairs were generally carried out 
by contractors while individuals dealt with detritus removal.  
3.4 2009 Samoan Tsunami 
The 2009 Samoan Tsunami hit the South Eastern corner of Upolu Island on September 29, 
2009.  The tsunami killed 143 people (Samoa Logistics Cluster, 2009) and affected 4389 people 
(Ministry of Health, 2009) – with many of the impacted communities choosing to permanently 
relocate inland.  Disaster response and recovery was primarily implemented through a mix of 
central government and non-governmental organisations.  Primarily waste was collected and 
segregated at the affected site by pooled labour from the community (both paid and unpaid) and 
contractors were employed to collect and transport the waste to the disposal site or recycling 
depot. 
3.5 2005 Hurricane Katrina, United States 
Hurricane Katrina hit the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama on 29 August 2005.  As 
a result of heavy rain and a levee breach around 80% of New Orleans was flooded in 3-12 feet 
of water (Cook, 2009).  Over 1800 people died and over 600,000 residential properties were 
affected – 77% totally destroyed.  Large numbers of residents evacuated and some had still not 
returned in 2009 (Brookings Institute, 2009).  The US, then and now, has well established 
debris management processes including implementation strategies.  Generally clearance of 
private properties is carried out by individual private property owners and placed on the kerb 
for collection by local authority or FEMA appointed contractors.  Demolitions and resultant 
waste management are also the responsibility of the individual home owner or their insurer / 
appointed contractor.  However, due to the large scale of the event, the high public health risk 
from toxic flood sediments and the large number of displaced persons, FEMA funded and 
facilitated all debris removal and demolition on private properties.  The works were carried out 
under centralised contracts in line with standard debris management procedures. 
3.6 Summary 
Table 1, below, summarises the implementation strategies used for the different waste 
management activities for each case study.   
Table 1: Case study disaster debris management implementation strategies summary  
 2010 
Canterbury 
Earthquake 
2009 
Victorian 
Bushfires 
2009 L’Aquila 
Earthquake 
2009 Samoan 
Tsunami 
2005 Hurricane 
Katrina 
1. Detritus 
removal 
 
2. Collection and 
disposal 
3. Major repair 
debris  
4. Demolition and 
debris 
1. Individual 
 
 
2. n/a 
 
3. Central 
contract 
4. Central 
contract 
1. n/a 
 
 
2. n/a 
 
3. n/a 
 
4. Central 
contract 
1. Individual 
 
 
2. Central 
contract 
3. Individual 
 
4. Central 
contract 
1. Individual 
/ pooled 
labour 
2. Central 
contract 
3. Individual 
 
4. Individual 
1. Individual / 
collective 
 
2. Central 
contract 
3. Individual 
 
4. Central 
contract 
4. Analysis 
Five key impacts were assessed: timeliness; completeness; environmental; economic; and 
social.  The attributes are shown in Table 2 below.  This list was then used to qualitatively 
assess the overall suitability of the three main implementation strategies for disaster debris 
management (see Discussion, Section 6).    
 
Table 2: Positive attributes associated with successful implementation of demolition and debris 
management. 
Positive implementation strategy attributes2
Timeliness 
 
• Expedient management of debris. 
• Limited / manageable number of organisations involved to reduce delays. 
• Monitoring of whole waste management system including identification and 
mitigation of bottlenecks. 
• Targets exist for completion times 
• Pre-arranged contracts for fast mobilisation post-disaster. 
• Appropriate prioritisation of works. 
• Legal and/or regulatory bottlenecks are identified and mitigated (including 
property access, waste ownership and contractor certification). 
• Efforts to maximise available workforce (e.g. use of community, expediting 
contractor certification) 
• Motivated work force (e.g through payment of volunteers, use of local labour). 
                                                     
2 Note that many of the attributes have several impacts, for example unnecessary delays are likely to have 
environmental, economic and social consequences.  Here, for brevity, attributes are only mentioned once. 
• Efficient use of limited resources including equipment and personnel. 
Completeness • Avoids double-ups or omissions. 
• Consistency of service (extent and quality) across all organisations. 
• Personnel and equipment are not taken away from core duties (for example 
municipal waste collection). 
• Approach matches nature of disaster waste (e.g. scattered waste following the 
Samoan tsunami made an individual property owner response inappropriate). 
• System does not rely on public participation where population is absent or ill-
equipped to deal with the waste. 
• Good communication and collaboration between waste handling personnel, 
contractors, waste facilities and local and regulatory authorities. 
Environmental • Reduces potential for environmentally unsound management of waste including 
contractor certification, monitoring, guideline provision, access to waste 
management facilities etc. 
• Minimises monitoring requirements (on stretched regulatory authorities) 
• Encourages environmentally beneficial practices including recycling and reuse 
(on or offsite) 
• Environmental management of entire waste management stream (from 
prioritisation to collection and disposal). 
• Personnel experienced in waste / environmental management. 
• Personnel with vested interest in appropriate waste / environmental management. 
• Minimises rogue contractors 
Economic 
 
• Allows for economies of scale (e.g. reducing costs, improving recycling 
economics). 
• Minimises double handling. 
• Stimulates local economy (e.g. use of local services, recycling revenues). 
• Minimised profiteering / price gouging. 
Social 
 
• Public health threats are mitigated for all waste handlers, in particular where 
public participation is expected. 
• Clean-up personnel are trusted. 
• Allows for personal property salvage. 
• Empowers affected persons to participate in their own recovery. 
• Builds social resilience for future disasters. 
• Clear communication with community. 
• Community acceptance of programme including speed of implementation. 
• Encourages use of local labour and waste management facilities. 
• Does not place unreasonable burden on impacted community (e.g. having to 
manage hazardous wastes). 
5. Discussion 
The choice of implementation strategies (collectively or individually facilitated works) is 
impacted by a number of factors including disaster impact (e.g. degree of hazard in the waste, 
the dispersion of the waste, the number of displaced persons).  Institutional factors such as 
organisational structures, legal constraints (such as property access and waste ownership) and 
funding provision also influence possible implementation strategies.  The following discussion 
looks at each implementation strategy and discusses the benefits and draw backs, based on the 
attributes in Table 2 above, of each strategy in different disaster situations and contexts.   
5.1 Collectively facilitated works 
As shown in Table 1, in the case studies looked at here, generally collection and disposal and 
demolition debris management have been carried out using collective approaches.  The cases 
here have all had funding systems which allowed for a collective approach.  As discussed in 
previous research by the authors of this paper (Brown et al., 2011 in print) debris management 
implementation strategies are closely linked to funding mechanisms.  Recovery funds are 
primarily either held by or distributed to individuals, or they are held / managed collectively.  
The nature of the funding will often limit which implementation strategies can be used.  For 
example, where a disaster recovery system relies on market insurance at an individual level, 
collective systems such as centralised contractors and pooled labour forces are less likely.  
However, the 2010 Canterbury Earthquake response is an example of where large insurance 
companies have seen the need to manage their claims and the works as a collective. 
There are many benefits to a collective approach.  First, directly facilitated programmes 
essentially take the risk of cost overruns away from individuals.  Cost overruns are a possibility 
following a disaster where: price gouging is possible (Jordan, accessed 2010); there is limited 
time to make detailed cost estimates; and where markets prices are likely to vary over the 
duration of the recovery.  Second, economy of scale can be achieved through coordination of 
works, synergy of waste transportation, and negotiation of high volume service contracts.  
Third, quality assurance of works can be better affected using a centralised approach, thereby 
minimising potential for adverse environmental or public health effects.  It was alleged that 
immediately following the Canterbury earthquake some demolition operators were under-
quoting demolition jobs and illegally dumping debris.  Centralised contracts can simplify 
monitoring requirements and avoid this.  Fourth, coordination, timing and prioritisation of 
works can be better directed and controlled.  This is particularly important in business areas 
where other businesses can be disrupted by demolition activities.  In Christchurch the 
demolition of a historic building in the central city took approximately 11 weeks and severely 
disrupted traffic flows, pedestrian access and nearby business trading.  Fifth, collective 
facilitation generally allows for awareness and management of the entire waste management 
system.  For example, a collectively managed system may be able to better forecast when 
additional facilities are required (such as temporary storage sites or recycling facilities) to 
process disaster debris.  Individually facilitated works, on the other hand, rely on use of existing 
systems and forecasting of future needs may be difficult particularly where there are privacy 
issues (e.g. under private insurance schemes).  
Some disasters necessitate collective responses.  Where the disaster impact causes mixing of 
wastes between properties and into public spaces, determining clean-up responsibility and 
ownership prior to waste removal is not practical.  The Samoan tsunami is an example of this.  
Light traditional housing materials and household items were transported hundreds of meters by 
the tidal surge.   
There are also some challenges associated with collective management of wastes.  Legal issues 
around waste ownership and property access need to be addressed.  Prior to debris removal by 
contractors following the Victorian Bushfires, every property owner was required to authorise 
property access and ownership of all waste materials (other than personal items salvaged) to the 
contractor.  This approval may be hard to gain where the population is absent, such as 
following Hurricane Katrina.  Many houses there had to be condemned by the local authority in 
order to gain entry rights and ownership of waste materials.  Some communities felt that the 
waste materials or value of recovered materials should remain in the affected community.  In 
Samoa, for example, some communities preferred to manage the waste themselves to retain the 
value of the recyclable materials.   
From an environmental point of view, having a collective contract for debris removal, 
disassociated with repair and reconstruction works, limits the potential for reuse of building 
materials on site for us in rebuilding.  Reuse and/or recycling of disaster damaged houses is 
also linked to psychological benefits (Denhart, 2009).  It should be noted that the conditions of 
some funding mechanisms (e.g. private insurance) may not allow for such a practice anyway. 
Collective responses can get carried out faster but perhaps with less consideration than ideal.  A 
number of recent examples illustrate where a more considered and slower response might have 
been better: adverse health impacts resulting from the 2001 World Trade Centre collapse clean-
up (9-11 Research, accessed 2011a); destruction of evidence during the World Trade Centres 
clean-up (9-11 Research, accessed 2011b); accusations of government corruption following the 
Wenchuan earthquake, China, where some bodies were allegedly bulldozed with the building 
rubble (Demick, 2009); and loss of personal property during debris removal by overzealous 
volunteers following the 1995 Kobe earthquake (Atsumi and Yamori, 2008).  
5.1.1 Collective works human resourcing 
Demolition and debris management activities involve a range of tasks requiring skilled and non-
skilled labour and common and specialist equipment.  Consequently, collective waste 
management initiatives can be resourced a number of ways.  Primarily these are: by engaging a 
private contractor to manage all the works; or by engaging and managing a labour pool – likely 
to consist of skilled and unskilled individuals who may be paid or unpaid.  Several 
considerations need to be made when designing an implementation strategy. 
Private contractors are generally an efficient method of carrying out a large work programme, 
and if managed correctly have the capacity to make use of local labour forces.  Ideally 
contractors would have waste management expertise; however, in many cases this is not 
possible.  The contractor managing debris following the Victorian Bushfires was a large 
construction firm (Brown et al., 2010).  In the US, however, there is a growing industry of 
disaster debris management specialist contractors which can be mobilised quickly (Fickes, 
2010). 
Some communities, however, resent large contractors being used for debris management, as 
most originate from outside the affected area.  First, some communities and experts have 
expressed concerns over the quality (in particular with respect to environmental outcomes) of 
the waste management works.  Allen (2007) cites the lack of local knowledge and lack of care 
for long term impacts of debris management activities by non-local contractors as a concern.  
Second, where non-local contractors are brought in, jobs, and the associated economic benefits, 
are being taken away from the affected area, as observed following the Victorian Bushfires 
(Brown et al., 2010) and as demonstrated by Haas et al. (Haas et al., 1977).  Third, some have 
cited the adverse psychological effects of not participating in their own recovery, also observed 
following the Victorian Bushfires (Brown et al., 2010). 
While community participation in disaster recovery planning is a well recognised ideal with 
many benefits (Sullivan, 2003, Phillips, 2009) including empowering communities and 
mitigating potential mental health issues, the benefits of physically participating has been less 
well researched.  Parallels can perhaps be drawn to the psychological benefits of general 
volunteerism, under the assumption that the benefits still apply to disaster affected persons.  
The major benefits of volunteering in a disaster recovery situation include decreasing 
psychological distress and depression, improving mental health and drawing people away from 
inappropriate means of coping (Phillips, 2009).  Respondents to a study on community recovery 
after the 2003 Canberra bushfires in Australia noted that ‘having a sense of control and 
acceptance and engaging in meaningful activities’ aided them in their recovery (Camilleri et al., 
2010).  Participation in recovery activities also has the potential to build capacity within the 
community.  From a manager’s point of view, community participation potentially provides a 
large and cheap work force. 
Community participation is constrained, however.  Significant public health hazards require 
specialist persons and equipment and in some cases individuals do not understand this.  For 
example, many people volunteering their services following the World Trade Centre collapse 
September 11 were turned away due to the potential risks and specialist skills required to work 
on a crime scene holding human remains.  Many of those turned away reported leaving feeling 
frustrated (Phillips, 2009).  Protection against liability is also a concern.  Many States in the US 
address this through Good Samaritan laws (Phillips, 2009).  Some communities also do not 
wish to participate.  Lawther (2009) observed indifference in the wake of the Indian Ocean 
tsunami in the Maldives where locals were unwilling to participate either due to private 
recovery / livelihood efforts or dissatisfaction with proposed payrates.  Lawther also identified 
general risks of relying on volunteers including negative impacts on quality and cost. 
Even if non-local contractors are used, there is a possibility of using local labour as 
subcontractors.  This option is perhaps a good compromise between the cost and time secure 
option of private contractors while maximising community participation. 
5.2  Individually Facilitated Works 
Table 1 shows that detritus removal from private property (in these case studies), is generally 
the responsibility of individual property owners.  As well as the legal issues (property entry and 
waste ownership) mentioned in the previous section, this is generally the most expedient and 
cost effective way (for government) of clearing of debris from private properties.  However, 
there are situations where this approach is not so effective.  First, individual responses are less 
efficient where debris management requires specialist equipment and/or personnel.  For 
example, if there is a significant public health threat (as discussed in the following section) 
individual’s would either be required to engage a specialist to carry out the work (potentially 
creating a resourcing bottle neck) or as Allen (2007) observes, those that cannot afford to pay 
contractors may put themselves at risk.  In New Orleans, following Katrina, the standard 
expectation of individual property owners to clear detritus had to be revised in light of the high 
level of contamination in the flood sediments.  FEMA elected to facilitate a central contract for 
this work.  Also if the level of destruction is high and/or the nature of the waste is heavy and/or 
requires specialist equipment (such as the fallen masonry buildings following Haiti (Booth, 
2010)) an individual property approach may be cumbersome.  Second if the population has 
been largely displaced, such as following Hurricane Katrina (Cook, 2009), they cannot be relied 
upon to clean-up properties.  Third, if waste has been transported due to the disaster impact to 
other properties and into public spaces (e.g. Samoa), then individual waste ownership and 
responsibility is difficult to assign and waste is likely to go unmanaged. 
Also, as shown in Table 1, debris management from major repairs are generally carried out at 
an individual level.  This is largely due to the funding mechanisms available and the timing of 
the works.  The majority of funding for major repair (and associated debris management) was 
granted to individual property owners for self-management of the works.  Thus a centralised 
system was not necessarily possible (except in Canterbury where collective management of 
individual claims was implemented).  Because of the long time period and geographical spread 
over which repairs may be carried out, a collective waste management system may not be as 
cost effective or logistically feasible as it is for detritus removal and/or demolition debris 
management.  In addition, there is logic in capitalising on the synergy between debris 
management and repair works (as discussed above). 
6. Conclusions 
Generally detritus removal activities and debris management of major repair work are 
individually facilitated.  Debris collection, demolition and disposal are best carried out 
collectively.  As the case studies have shown, however, the suitability of implementation 
strategies is highly dependent on many contextual (in particular funding and legal constraints) 
and environmental factors (disaster size and nature).  Many of the case studies discussed here 
significantly altered established approaches to disaster responses because existing systems were 
not seen as appropriate for the scale and impact of the event.  Disaster waste managers need to 
have flexible plans in order to determine the most suitable implementation strategies specific to 
that event.  Institutional frameworks also need to be flexible enough to reflect the variability of 
disaster impact.  Appropriate human resourcing of recovery works, in particular use of local 
labour, has many positive environmental, economic and social effects on the affected 
community. 
It is envisaged that this analysis will assist in the improved implementation of post-disaster 
demolition and debris management programmes.  The findings in this paper will also provide 
insight into the impact of recovery resourcing on other aspects of recovery. 
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